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Pre-Trial Procedure In Practice
By LOGAN E. PATrERSON*
First regularly employed in Detroit in 1929, pre-trial procedure
is no longer a novelty in the United States. Since that date it has
been the object of so much intelligent thought and enlightened
comment that one would hesitate to offer a serious and scholarly
discussion of the subject unless profoundly prepared or blissfully
ignorant. Perhaps, though, there is still justification for some observations on the practical, if somewhat less profound, aspects of
a technique which is destined to become a part of the body of
procedural law in Kentucky.
In evaluating the potentialities of any legal device, our fraternity is often apt to forget the most important of fundamentals,
like the fisherman who arrives at camp with flashlight and beer,
but no tackle. Preoccupied with details, we are prone to forget
that the trial of cases is for litigants, not lawyers, nor even judges.
The primary aim in the enactment and enforcement of laws
should be to see that justice is done as swiftly, simply, and economically as possible. When this fact is recognized, most of the
criticism that has been expresed regarding pre-trial procedure
loses its persuasion.
It is no tragedy, for instance, if pre-trial practice tends to
produce settlements of controversies. This might reduce the pure
volume of the lawyer's business, but if the settlements are equitable, and beneficial to the litigants, the practitioner can contemplate his reduced fee with the consoling thought that he has done
a good job for his client, and is ready for another task.
It is probably true, too, that the lazy and careless lawyer
benefits from pre-trial procedure far beyond his just deserts, but
if his client thereby is saved from being the victim of his attorney's shortcomings, the attorney's good fortune must be accepted
philosophically as one of the inescapable inequities of existence.
After all, it would have been foolish to have thrown in the sponge
in World War II just to have had the Russians share the defeat.
* Member of Kentucky and Federal Court Bars. Address: Pineville, Kentucky.
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For several years pre-trial conferences pursuant to Rule 16 of
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have been regularly employed in most of the civil cases in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky. Under the rule, the
Judge of the court is at liberty to hold conferences when and as he
sees fit. In this district, they have been held generally in the
Judge's chambers, and with complete informality. Usually, only
the Judge and the attorneys are present. The informality and the
fact that conferees are limited to those with legal training have
been conducive to a relaxed, understanding, and cooperative atmosphere, reasonably free of the guarded and non-committal attitude prevailing during a formal trial. The practical benefits have
been as obvious to the working practitioner of modest ability as
they could possibly be to the most studious observer and thorough
scholar.
Actually, when properly pursued, pre-trial procedure is only
the application of common sense to the preparation and disposition of actions. Of necessity, the preparation and trial of suits
involve numerous technical requirements. It is not the function
of pre-trial procedure to eliminate these requirements entirely,
but rather to put them in proper perspective, establish by discussion and agreement those which are not really at issue, and prevent the remainder from becoming vehicles for burdensome expense or the miscarriage of justice.
For example, it is doubtful that pre-trial orders were intended
to replace pleadings. So that the litigant will not change vessels
and destination after having embarked, some character of pleading is always going to be necessary, just as written contracts are
necessary in order to keep the wishful thinker from forgetting the
true nature of his bargain. However, pre-trial discussions can and
do correct erroneous pleadings, eliminate surplusage and confusion, and reduce the pleadings to clear, fundamental, triable
issues. After a good conference between sincere lawyers and a
capable judge, there is no reason for a litigant to lose his case
because of some oversight or confusion in the pleadings. If the
issue is incapable of being properly pleaded, there was never any
issue in the first place, and it is well to know it before incurring
the expense of trial preparation.
Too, as every lawyer knows, most cases are like an old attic,
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cluttered with every conceivable sort of old chromo and keepsake,
principally of highly dubious value. As with the questionable
treasure in the attic, we cannot bring ourselves to destroy or discard this surplus accumulation, for some day we might need some
of it, but the mass of it makes it difficult to find what we are seeking. It is the function of pre-trial to find what is being sought,
and before the day of trial, for it is doubly difficult to find a gem
in the attic if the house is burning. So, in pre-trial discussions,
the conscientious judge and attorneys can push aside those necessary fixtures about which there is no real controversy. Is there any
genuine dispute as to the state in which the plaintiff is incorporated? Can it be admitted that the contract was undertaken by
the defendant's authorized agent? Without any admission concerning the significance of such notice, can it be stipulated that
defendant's agent, now dead, did apprise plaintiff of defendant's
claim, and did this take place on May 24th? Questions like these
can be vital issues in a case, concerning which no concessions
can be made. Often, though, they are only technicalities about
which there is no real controversy, but which can be very expensive and tedious to prove. In many instances, the simplest way to
dispose of them is in pre-trial conference.
There is hardly any limit to the practical problems which can
best be solved by bona fide discussion between the lawyers and
the judge in advance of trial. At what place can the case be tried
most conveniently to all concerned? When should it be set for
trial? Shall the bars be let down so that the litigants can try to
overwhelm one another by sheer weight of the number of their
expert witnesses, or shall it be provided, in mercy to the litigants
and jurors, that each side be limited to a reasonable number of
expert witnesses? Who actually does have the burden of proof in
a case of the kind under discussion? If the defendant is planning
to use an elaborate and expensive exhibit on the trial, is he expecting the plaintiff to pay for it as a part of the recoverable costs
in the event of a victory for defendant? Are there questions relating to the competency and admissibility of evidence which
should be determined before trial? Are all necessary parties
actually before the court? If not, can they be brought before the
court without the expense of summons? Who shall be authorized
to receive notice for numerous parties? These and other practical
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questions of similar character present themselves in the course of
preparation and trial, and most of them are best determined
before the day of trial.
Nothing, perhaps, has been worn quite so threadbare as the
old aphorism to the effect that one gets out of a project whatever
he puts into it, yet this somewhat smug maxim is peculiarly applicable to pre-trial procedure. If there is to be criticism of the
practical results of the device as used in the Eastern District of
Kentucky, it must be that it has failed to produce the benefits of
which it is potentially capable, largely for want of thought and
preparation. Too often, the Judge has been the only person at the
conference who has really given the matter any study. In response
to the order of the Court, the lawyers are there, amiable enough,
but not very helpful. Most of us must plead guilty to not having
given our case the serious and concentrated thought necessary
to anticipate probable diffculties and their possible solutions.
When the Judge has posed a question, we have looked at one
another hopefully, each thinking that maybe the other fellow
has thought of this before. After a few such embarrassing sessions, many lawyers have decided that they were getting very
little out of an implement which has great inherent possibilities.
Aside from the rather too pat admonition that more work and
thought be given to coming pre-trial conferences, one practical
device for improving the procedure does suggest itself. In the
order calling the conference, the Judge usually sets out the agenda
in general terms. In addition to this, it might be well if some
system could be devised whereby the attorneys could notify their
adversaries and the Judge, in advance of the conference, of particular questions or problems which they expect to present and
discuss at the meeting. It probably would not be very important
whether the giving of such notice was attended with any particular formality, but if all the participants in the contemplated
conference had some advance information regarding the subjects
to be discussed, at least they would have better opportunity to be
adequately prepared, and thereby derive more numerous and
concrete advantages from the joint efforts.
The day of winning lawsuits by "tricks" is about over, and
good riddance. Such successes might win a lawyer the reputation of being "slick", but it is debatable whether this adjective is
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complimentary when applied to lawyers, and public regard for
the courts is not enhanced when justice is outraged because one
lawyer is "slicker" than another. Properly employed, pre-trial
procedure will prove to be the diligent lawyer's best friend, a boon
to overworked jurists, and a protective safeguard for those who
seek to vindicate their rights in our courts. By simplifying the
trial and reducing the expense of cases, it can, and probably will
give the layman a better understanding of the function of the
courts, and increase his sympathy and respect for courts as institutions.

